role ofethics in protecting the patient and maintaining the solidarity ofthe profession. The second derives from the observation that thefoundations ofcontemporary medical ethics were laid at a time ofone-to-one doctor-patient relations while nowadays most doctors work in or are associated with large-scale organisations. Records cease to be the property ofindividual doctors, become available not only to other doctors but also to educational and social work personnel. Making records openly available to patients is suggested as the only antidote to this irreversible loss ofindividual practitioner control. The importance for doctors ofunderstanding the nature ofprofessional and bureaucratic organisations in order to deal with the hazards involved is stressed as is the responsibility ofthe General Medical Council to regulate medical competence as well as personal behaviour.
How might a social science view of medical ethics and medical practice be different from any other? First, a social scientist is interested in the nature of the social relations in which and to which ethical principles are to be applied and what power relations are involved. Second, social science assumes that medical knowledge and medical practice are not neutral but are social institutions essentially similar to other social institutions. They arise, change and adapt in historic time and in response to social, economic and technical change (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) .
Medicine as a social institution has rather distinct features however: first, its central intention of alleviating human suffering; second, the control over life and death which may be in its practitioners' hands. In a paper in 1982 Dr Pheby pointed out that authority is ascribed to medical opinions not only because of the esteem in which the medical profession is held but also because medical opinions are generally considered to be scientific. Yet, he argues, many medical judgements contain value judgements which are not scientific since they cannot be falsified. Once having passed into the files however they become inaccessible and incapable of correction. They may have the effect of 'labelling' the patient in such a way that the subsequent judgement of that doctor or of others is clouded or warped. He cites three cases I had earlier reported of mothers who were tranquillised as 'anxious' when their anxieties were ultimately shown to be justified upon a diagnosis in their children of congenital dislocation of the hip. In these cases the doctor had failed to perceive a physical disability in the child, thinking the problem was in the mother's mind. They were apparently not cases in which the mother was tranquillised in the belief that this would help her deal with a serious and well-founded anxiety. Pheby argues that in those cases: 'There were in fact two hypotheses, one non-scientific ("this mother is anxious") and one scientific ("this child is not ill"). The latter "scientific" hypothesis, being a null hypothesis, could be falsified by a positive finding, and this is clearly what happened eventually, rendering the "non-scientific" hypothesis irrelevant' (15) .
Or perhaps not so much that as demonstrating that the mothers' anxieties were not imaginary or pathological but well-founded: those mothers' observations of their children were in advance of their physicians'. The attribution of 'anxious mother' which assumed neurosis, or similar pathology, was based on nothing more than the repeated presentation of a child the mothers felt to be ill and who was later shown to be ill. The ability of mothers to recognise serious illness in a child, even if they are unable to name the trouble, has been demonstrated by Spencer (16) . Clearly Dr Pheby has performed an important service in drawing our attention to the hazards of such data being on file, particularly as it may be used by others in a different context. Dr Pheby bases his argument on a distinction between hard and soft data.
Yet I am not convinced that this distinction which is also being suggested by the European Economic Community Conseil des Ordres can be sustained as clearly as Dr Pheby thinks. In an article with clearly humane intentions Dr Robertson (17) discusses ways of preserving the dignity of brain-damaged elderly people. He appears to have no doubt that he is dealing with a diagnosable organic condition for which positive evidence can be presented. Yet he makes no mention of psycho-social circumstances which may lead to similar symptoms. He discusses various options, focusing on one he calls 'dignity not senility for the elderly' and discusses circumstances in which it might be best not to initiate treatment. He continues:
'Patients who subject themselves to serious indignities such as persistent shouting or screaming represent a group who merit more rational, and at the same time more compassionate, management, even if the necessary sedative treatment promotes the development of a life-threatening condition' (18) . The assumption of individual responsibility in the phrase 'subject themselves' I find interesting. We are all aware of the phenomenon of the elderly confused, the apparent departure from the living body of the person we knew and associated tiresome behaviour, wandering, babbling, inexplicable aggression and the like. At the same time are we quite clear how we might distinguish between organic brain damage and those whose 'awkward' or 'bad' behaviour may derive from the indignities they are presently experiencing in a hard-pressed geriatric ward? How much do we really know about the social and psychological circumstances which can send an elderly patient 'demented'?
Another area in which a good deal of conceptual confusion occurs is the paediatric assessment of handicap. It is quite common for paediatricians and others to record 'ESN(S)' -(severely educationally subnormal) as a diagnosis of a child. What this appears to mean is that as a consequence of multidisciplinary assessment and sometimes in anticipation of it, the paediatrician concludes that the child has special educational needs. As my colleague Dyson has argued (in an unpublished comment on Family Focus 1983, a Coventry-based group of parents), drawing on Tomlinson (19) needs are not a diagnosis nor is ESN a medical category.
Many ethical problems surround multi-disciplinary work. And always many people are involved in one person's treatment. Doctors may cloud the vision of others involved in a case by unsubstantiated comments of a stereotyping kind. How much more important is this when the diagnosis will be picked up and acted upon by other authorities, say education or social services.
Many files contain an implicit evaluation of parents by professionals, an evaluation seemingly based on the degree to which parents react to circumstances in the way professionals think appropriate, and on the extent to which these reactions help or hinder professional work. These judgements may later influence decisions about the child or members of the family at some crucial stage in their future lives. How careful therefore doctors have to be that only well substantiated and publicly defensible comments are recorded! Cohen (20) reports that in a hospital where an open records system has been established doctors talk through their 'contentious' comments with patients before making or recording them. Throwaway remarks are no longer put down unthinkinglyremarks of the kind that can take on the appearance of fact after a time.
The 'closed system' in which the medical profession works, wherein the greater part of social as (27) .
To conclude. I have argued that education is required to draw attention to the way in which the social organisation of the medical profession may lead doctors to emphasise those facets of medical ethics which relate to the protection of the profession rather than to those designed to protect the public. Also I have argued that an understanding of the complex social organisation of medical practice is necessary to alert practitioners to the ethical implications of their actions. Two facets are particularly important: first, the nature of the social distance between doctor and patient and the relative powerlessness of the latter which leads to an ever present hazard that she/he will be unconsciously treated as an object, not a full and equal human being. The hypothesis that this hazard would be reduced if records were open to patients merits systematic study. Second, the social nature of the large-scale organisation of hospital medicine and of welfare and educational authorities requires systematic study. I have shown how records circulating round a number of authorities can render a doctor almost powerless to retrieve mistaken judgements once they have gone on record whether in a manual file or on computer. The rootedness of ethics in social relations requires more systematic understanding than it has hitherto received including an understanding of when secrecy is for the protection of the profession and when for the protection of the public.
What are the implications of these conclusions for the GMC? First, the council must clearly continue to examine its guidelines and procedures carefully to ensure that the weight of its authority is at least as much upon the protection of the public as of the profession. Council has recently discussed the question ofthe relationship between competence to practice and professional conduct. It has agreed to point out to doctors that they have privilege in raising with council fears about a colleague's malpractice or incompetence in practice. This is well because what Stebbing (28) said many years ago remains true: 'If the doctor is to do his work he must be trusted. This does not mean merely that the doctor must be kindly and personally reliable and punctilious in performing his engagements; he must be reliable in his medical knowledge and skill; ...' (Emphasis in original).
Council might wish to continue to work to reduce the large grey area in which doctors are not prepared to comment on each others' actions in practice. Such a reduction would be in the interests of the profession also. A doctor who is incompetent in practice is seen by the public quite simply as 'doing wrong'. Lay people have no difficulty in seeing this as an ethical issue. All doctors are aware how difficult such judgements are. More openness as to records would help the public to share these problems too.
